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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
LAWRENCE SCOTT ANDRUS, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
          NO. 42878 
 
          Twin Falls County Case No.  
          CR-2014-2897 
 
           
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Has Andrus failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, either 
by imposing a unified sentence of 10 years, with two years fixed, upon his conviction for 
felony DUI, or by denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence? 
 
 
Andrus Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
 
 Andrus was convicted of felony DUI (two or more prior DUI convictions within 10 
years) and the district court imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with two years 
fixed.  (R., pp.71-73, 281, 284, 313-18.)  Andrus filed a notice of appeal timely from the 
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judgment of conviction.  (R., pp.335-37.)  He also filed a timely Rule 35 motion for a 
reduction of sentence, which the district court denied.  (R., pp.320-21, 330-34.)     
Andrus asserts his sentence is excessive in light of his status as a first-time felon 
and his claim that “the district court failed to provide any valid rationale for why [his] 
case warranted a prison sentence.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-7.)  The record supports the 
sentence imposed.   
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard 
considering the defendant’s entire sentence.  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 
P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 
(2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)).  It is presumed that the 
fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement.  Id. 
(citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).  Where a sentence is 
within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear 
abuse of discretion.  State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing 
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).  To carry this burden the 
appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the 
facts.  Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615.  A sentence is reasonable, however, if it 
appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the 
related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.  Id.   
The maximum prison sentence for felony DUI (two or more prior DUI convictions 
within 10 years) is 10 years.  I.C. § 18-8005(6)(a).  The district court imposed a unified 
sentence of 10 years, with two years fixed, which falls well within the statutory 
guidelines.  (R., pp.313-18.)  At sentencing, the state addressed Andrus’ ongoing 
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willingness to endanger the community by driving while intoxicated and the fact that, at 
the time of sentencing in the instant case, Andrus still had an outstanding DUI charge in 
Nevada for an incident in which he “caused a car accident.”  (12/5/14 Tr., p.607, Ls.10-
14; PSI, p.20.1)  Contrary to Andrus’ claim on appeal, the state did not focus on a “belief 
that Mr. Andrus was a member of too many religions” (Appellant’s brief, p.6); rather, the 
state simply set forth its concern that Andrus was continuing his previously-
demonstrated manipulative behavior (see 12/5/14 Tr., p.607, Ls.6-10; p.626, L.25 – 
p.627, L.3; PSI, p.28) by abusing the social services offered by various religious 
denominations (12/5/14 Tr., p.609, L.9 – p.610, L.1).  Specifically, the state indicated, 
“[T]here is nothing wrong with adhering to more than one religion, but what is wrong is 
that it appears to be taking advantage of others” (12/5/14 Tr., p.609, Ls.21-24).   
Furthermore, while Andrus asserts that the district court’s decision to impose 
sentence “appears to be entirely related to the court not liking Mr. Andrus’s attitude” and 
that it was “unclear what part of his allocution the district court found offensive” 
(Appellant’s brief, p.6), the district court made it clear that its decision was based on 
Andrus’ refusal to accept responsibility for his criminal behavior, particularly his 
continued justification and rationalization of his actions, which indicated he was not 
“prepared to change” (12/5/14 Tr., p.627, Ls.6-8; p.628, Ls.9-10; p.629, Ls.13-15).  
Indeed, Andrus denied committing any crime other than “misdemeanor public 
intoxication” (12/5/14 Tr., p.616, Ls.18-20), indicating that his conviction for felony DUI 
“testifies to the triumphs of untruths and conjecture” (12/5/14 Tr., p.616, Ls.14-17).    
                                            
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “Supreme 
Court No. 42878 Lawrence Scott Andrus Confidential Exhibits.pdf.”   
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At sentencing, the district court articulated the correct legal standards applicable 
to its sentencing decision and also set forth in detail its reasons for imposing Andrus’ 
sentence.  (12/5/14 Tr., p.623, L.16 – p.630, L.9.)  The state submits that Andrus has 
failed to establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons more fully set forth in the attached 
excerpt of the sentencing hearing transcript, which the state adopts as its argument on 
appeal.  (Appendix A.)   
Andrus next asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his 
Rule 35 motion.  If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction 
of sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this court reviews the denial of the 
motion for an abuse of discretion.  State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203, 159 P.3d 
838, 840 (2007).  To prevail on appeal, Andrus must “show that the sentence is 
excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district 
court in support of the Rule 35 motion.”  Id.  Andrus has failed to satisfy his burden.   
Andrus provided no new information in support of his Rule 35 motion; he merely 
reiterated his disagreement with the state’s sentencing comments.  (R., pp.322-28.)  On 
appeal, Andrus again argues that the district court should have reduced his sentence 
because his brother’s statements – which were discussed in the police report regarding 
a separate charge against Andrus for violation of a no contact order (PSI, p.33) – were, 
he claims, not credible since his brother allegedly has prior criminal convictions 
(Appellant’s brief, pp.7-8; R., pp.324-25).  Because Andrus complained about his 
brother’s credibility at the time of sentencing (12/5/14 Tr., p.618, L.10 – p.619, L.14), 
this was not new information before the district court.  Furthermore, it appears from the 
district court’s statements – both at sentencing and in its order denying Andrus’ Rule 35 
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motion – that the court gave very little, if any, weight to the state’s sentencing comments 
regarding Andrus’ brother.  (See 12/5/14 Tr., p.608, Ls.19-21; p.623, L.16 – p.630, L.9; 
R., pp.330-33.)  In its order denying Andrus’ Rule 35 motion, the district court articulated 
the correct legal standards applicable to its decision and also set forth its reasons for 
denying Andrus’ motion.  (R., pp.330-33.)  The state submits that Andrus has failed to 
establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons more fully set forth in the district court’s 
Order Denying Defendant’s I.C.R. 35 Motion without a Hearing, which the state adopts 
as its argument on appeal.  (Appendix B.)  The state further submits that by failing to 
establish his sentence was excessive as imposed, Andrus has also failed to establish 
that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion. 
 
Conclusion 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Andrus’ conviction and 
sentence and the district court’s order denying Andrus’ Rule 35 motion for a reduction of 
sentence. 
       
 DATED this 28th day of September, 2015. 
 
 
 
      _/s/_____________________________ 
      LORI A. FLEMING 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      VICTORIA RUTLEDGE 
      Paralegal 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 28th day of September, 2015, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic 
copy to: 
 
  ERIK R. LEHTINEN  
  DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 
at the following email address:  briefs@sapd.state.id.us. 
 
 
 
      _/s/_____________________________ 
     LORI A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney General    
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1 i in court today. She's off on an all expense college 1 : replacement, and without an earthly dwelhng, bun------i 
2 : paid scholarship to a college in Virginia. She wrote 2 · have a home in Christ. · 
3 · me this note before she left: I want you to know that 3 Please know I accept with deep humility and 
4 you have been a large part of my life since I have been ' 4 gratitude your sentence upon me. In the Psalms it is 
5 old enough to remember. I know that you are a good 5 written, because he loves me, says the Lord, l will 
6 person. I really do. Dad will keep us updated on some 6 rescue him, I will protect him, for he acknowledges my 
7 : of the things happening in your life, and I am so 7 l name. I believe I have acknowledged Him, ,Jesus Chrii,t, 
8 ! exceedingly glad to hear of the work and experiences 8 ' here in faith today. He has blessed me more than I 
9 i you've had with our lord Jesus. I've always been : 9 deserve. 
10 keepi11y you i11 my praye1s, and I appreciate your kind i 10 Thank you for hearing me, Your Honor. I 
11 words and well wishes. Virginia is going to be a huge 11 appreciate your kind attention. 
12 change for me, but I'm excited and ready. Have faith 12 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Andrus. 
13 and never give up hope. Much love and God bless. 13 Any reason, legal in nature, why sentence 
14 I hope I have provided you with a somewhat 14 should not be imposed today, Mr. Williams? 
15 broader view of my life, Your Honor, apart from the 15( MR. WILLIAMS: No, Your Honor. 
161 narrow scope presented by the prosecution. In jail I 16 THE COURT: As the attorneys know in this case 
17i was given the courage to formally resign my membership i 17 and I want you to know, Mr. Andrus, decisions on 
18 in the LDS organization. The decision has brought me l 18 sentencing should be guided by objective decisions, not 
19 much peace. I 19 subjective decisions. And mostly guided by the 
20 For nine months I have remained sober, 20 statutory factors in Idaho Gode Section 19-2521, the 
21 obviously, In Jall. although I'm sure Your Honor hears 21 reasons for justifying probation versus the reason (or 
221 occasionally about what's called squawking. I never 22, justifying incarceration in the penitentiary. And as 
23: partook. Alcohol consumption has been given over to 23: you heard me say to one of the last gentlemen, you were 
24· Jesus Christ, and my life is in His hands. I stand 24 in court here watching sentencing, the factors I have 
25i before you unemployed, indigent, in need of a left hip : 25 to look at under just general policy considerations are 
L 6221 _ __ __.,c .. ~··=====62=!31 
1 re a ilitatlOn components, the concept or oeterrence 1 ~ hlsc~fse, altiel fsome apparently incorrect. We 
2 both as to you and the public at large. In other 2 j ?~n't have a GAIN evaluation, what is required by 
3 words, this is what happens when you commit thP.se kind 3 , 19-2524, because you didn't participate in that. We 
4 j of crimes. Retribution, meaning punishment simply for 4 I don't have a mental health assessment because you 
5 l punishment's sake. I could impose any sentence In this . 5 didn't participate in that, and I will •• though I 
6 1 case up to ten years in the penitentiary just because I : 6 lhink there is still some dispute about this under 
7 : wanted to punish you, and I think I would be affirmed i 7 Idaho law, I've always taken the position that you have 
8 1 on appeal for that. But I've never felt that's the 8 the right to remain silent, and that's what I told you 
9 real correct rationale, and I just don't do that. And 9 ; at the time of·· when I ordered those things, and I do 
10 then the good order and protection of society, which is 10' not in any way hold that against you. That's your 
11 the most important factor that I have to consider. 11 constitutional right. Unfortunately, there's also a 
12! You have been through two trials in this case. : 12 consequence to that. That means that I don't have all 
13/ I want to make this record absolutely crystal clear, I i 13 the Information that I'd like to have. So the 
14i do not in any way hold that against you. It's your ' 14 detriment of you doing that is that it may or may not 
15 constitutional right. I understand the argument you 15 have hurt you in this case. 
16 made to the jury. They didn't accept it. Maybe they 16' What I really know about Scott Andrus is what 
17 would have, maybe they wouldn't, but they didn't. But 17 I learned at the trial in this case. You're an 
18 they found you guilty, and I will adjudge you guilty of , 1fl alcoholic, admitted. You have mental health problems, 
19: this crime based on that verdict. From your comments, 119 bipolar, admitted. You have a very good command of the 
20! it sounds like you're going to appeal it. That's fine. 20 English language. Watched you testify, listened to you 
21il That's your legal right, and we can talk about that 21 today. I think you're a very talented individual, and 
22 here in o second. 22! I think you are a very smart Individual. I know that 
23 We have talked about the fact that you did not 23 you are on tough times right now. Haven't worked for 
24 participate in the presentence investigation interview. 24 three years. I can glean that from that testimony. I 
25_Y_o_u _m_u~. h=_'ome because they've got some lntormation 
624 
25 know that you have taken someefforls to IJy to help ·---~sJ 
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1 yourself by going through the programs m Ifie Jaif,ana , 1 1 aaoresseo m fier closing argument or her arguments. 
2 I think that's commendable. I'm not sure what that I 21 You are a manipulative person because that entire, that 3 . means. I don't know what it means to graduate from any 13 , entire episode was nothing but manipulation. That's of 
4 ! of these classes, whether that means just simply 4 , great concern to me. I think you are the type of 
51 sining there listening to somebody all day long or • 5 ' Individual who will justify anything to get to an 
6 I c1clually pc1rlicipaling. And that's 011e of the ' 6 objective. Just the words you used today lo me tells 
7 ; troubling parts of this case because the issue of 7 me that you are rationalizing everything you do in 
8 ! trying to deal with addicts is a very, very complicated 8 1 life, Whether you're wearing rellglon on your sleeve 
9 ; issue for me. I have to try to determine whether 9 i or not, I don't know. That's your choice, not mine. 
10 somebody is really committed to the point of wanting to ! 10 What I have to be concerned about is this: 
11 change their life so that they don't come back before 1 11 When I am finished today and walk out of this courtroom 
12 the Court again. 112 and go home tonight, whether I put you on probation, a 
13, I'm not going to waste your t!me or anybody 131 retained jurisdiction, or send you to the penitentiary, 
14; else's time talking about the difficulty of DUls and 114'. can I sleep good tonight because I know that this 
15i the consequences to society. You know thc1t. 15 comrnunily is protected c19c1i11st you doing exactly the 
161 This cAse has an Aggravating factor in it in 16 same thing that you just did thAI got you before this 
17! that your conduct on the day in question caused a lot 17 1 Court? I'll tell you right now I have no comfort 
18: of problems. Any time police officers in this 18 ! level, Mr. Andrus, as to what will happen. I don't 
19: community get a suicide call to the Perrine Bridge, 19' trust you. 
20[ that's a big deal. Nobody wants that to happen. I ; 20 Clearly you're not going on probation today. 
21 I don't want that to happen, Madam Prosecutor certainly 21 I realize you have been in the county jail for 266 
221 doesn't. Nobody wants somebody to take their life. 22 days. You know, the normal DUI case that I see for 
23 I'm glad that it worked out that that wasn't the case. 23 somebody with your record -- let me segue for just a 
2{ Bui it goes to the heart of what I'm about to ; 24 minute. i place no weight, whatsoever, on the Nevada , 
251 get to. And that is exactly what Ms. Harrington 
626 
i 25 charge. Okay? I don't know anything about that ca~ 
1 I Tdon'tkii-ow Tiie circumstances, -it's not been------ - - - . I 1 f aoo-ut wnere tney've oeen in tneir hie, where tney're -i 
2 : documented. You haven't been convicted, so I want to ' 2 · going, what they ·· how they need to rethink things I 
3 : make it clcor agoin, that's not in play here. Okay? i 3 because I sec so many, particularly young people, who i 
4 J You're getting sentenced on what I have seen in the 14 have been brought up in an environment where they 
5 course of two trials and what I can glean from your 5 ! haven't had the right guidance that most people, normal 
6 j testimony and my observations of you and the very , 6 i people, whatever that might be, have. I don't think we 
7 : limited information in this presentence investigation ! 7 need that for you either. You're of age here where 
8 : report. ,1· 8 you've seen a whole lot more in life than most of us in 
9 I don't think you have come to accept 9 . this courtroom. 
10 responsibility for what you've done here. Mr. Williams 10; The third reason for riders is to evaluate 
11 1 is telling me, I think, in his argument, if I send you ! 11 people, find out what they're really thinking. I don't 
12i on the retained Jurisdiction program, he's concerned 1 12 think I need that in this case either. I've evaluated 
13 that you will essentially do what you've done through 131 you. As I just said, I think you rationallze 
14 the sentencing process here and that the Department of 14 · everyfhing you do. I don't think you are prepared to 
15! Corrections is going to say, relinquish Mr. Andrus. I : 15 change. and I am not going to take the risk, I'm not 
16, don't know if that's going to happen or not. ' 16 going to take the risk that someday probation should be 
17; There are two things, in my view, that 171 allowed to you. I'm going to leave that up to the 
181 retained jurisdictions do. One, it's to help ·- well, 1a· parole board. 
19 part of it's punishment. Okay? And I see so many , 19 It is the judgment of the Court that I order 
20: cases, particularly in drug and alcohol cases, where · 20 that you pay court costs as required by statute and 
21 f individuals just need a period of forced sobriety, and 21 rule. You are required to provide a DNA sample and a 
22 the retained jurisdiction does that. I don't think you 22 right thumbprint at a cost of $100 to you. I'm going 
?3 need lht1I in this case. You're ?66 days of forced ?.3 to order public defender restitution in this case in an 
24 sobriety. ! 24 amount of $2,500 for the cost of going through trials. 
25: _ .... ~,~~-5-econd thing is that to educate defendants 628125: I realize you're not in a posil-io_n_to_t_ak_e_c_a,_e_of-th_a_t _ _ . ___ !2!] 
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1 [foday. You will someday. Ano I'm going to orde{a ---· 
2 , penitentiary sentence of two years fixed, eight years 
~ j indeterminate, to be served in this case. 
41 Specifically rejecting probation. I am 
5 : rejecting a rider. I want to tell you why I am doing 
6 : that, Mr. Andrus: Because you talked me into doing 
7 1
1 
that today. Your allocution convinced me that you are 
8 not ready for either probation or riders. You did it 
9 to yourself. 
10; I will order a license suspension of two 
11 · years, absolute, following release from incarceration, 
1? followed by a two-year interlock requirement under the 
13 statute. You do you have the right to --you of 
14 j course, will be given credit for time served in this 
15: case. 
161 Do you agree, Madam Prosecutor, it's 266 days? 
17; MS. HARRINGTON: I have no reason to argue 
18: with that. 
19' THE COURT: We'll actually put that in this 
201 order that that's the amount of credit for time served. 
21 I You are remanded - if you wish to appeal this 
22 j decision, you must perfect that appeal within 42 days 
23/ of today. Notify Mr. Williams. He will perfect that 
241 appeal. 
25L_ _ '. will r~mand your custody to the sheriff~---
; 1 sir, or transport tot e penitentiary system. oo 
I
. 2 luck to you. 
3 : (End of proceedings at 2:57 p.m.) 
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0 e DISTRICT COURT Fifth Judicial District County t1f Tl'dn Falls • Stalo of ldlho 
DEC 3 O 2014 
ay----...,...._..:...ll:...:_,'li:..:..'O.:.:..:AM 
-/Ji c~~ 
I &,i,y Clorlt 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LAWRENCE scon ANDRUS, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-2014-2897 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
I.C.R. 35 MOTION WITHOUT A 
HEARING 
The Defendant, Lawrence Scott Andrus, was sentenced on December 5, 2014 
following the return of a guilty verdict for one count of Operating a Motor Vehicle Wh!le 
Under the Influence of Alcohol. The Court imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, which 
was comprised of a fixed period of confinement of two years, followed by an indeterminate 
eight-year period of custody. On December 15, 2014, the Defendant flied this Motion 
pursuant to I.C.R. 35 asking the Court to reconsider or reduce the imposed sentence. 
The Defendant's Motion also includes a request for oral argument In this matter, as well 
as an Affidavit of Lawrence Scott Andrus in support of the Motion. 
A Rule 35 motion may challenge a sentence as being excessive, unduly severe, 
and/or unreasonable at the time it was originally imposed. State v. Jensen, 137 Idaho 240 
(Ct.App.2002). A Rule 35 Motion to reduce a legally imposed sentence is essentially a 
plea for leniency and is directed to the sound discretion of the sentencing court. Where a 
sentence as originally imposed is not illegal, the defendant has the burden to show that it 
is unreasonable, and thus a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 393 
(1992). 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S I.C.R. 35 MOTION WITHOUT A HEARING - 1 
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Idaho Criminal Rule 35 states in part: 
The court may reduce a sentence within 120 days after the filing of a 
judgment of conviction or within 120 days after the court releases 
retained jurisdiction. The court may also reduce a sentence upon 
revocation of probation or upon motion made within fourteen (14) days 
after the filing of the order revoking probation. Motions to correct or modify 
sentences under this rule must be filed within 120 days of the entry of the 
judgment imposing sentence or order releasing retained jurisdiction and 
shall be considered and determined by the court without the 
admission of additional testimony and without oral argument, unless 
otherwise ordered by the court In Its discretion; provided, however that 
no defendant may file more than one motion seeking a reduction of 
sentence under this Rule. 
(emphasis added). When a defendant does not identify what evidence she might have 
produced at a hearing that she could not have been produced through affidavits, the 
district court does not abuse its discretion in refusing to hold a hearing on his Rule 35 
motion. State v. Ramirez, 122 Idaho 830 (Ct.App.1992). Nevertheless, it is error for the 
court to refuse to consider additional Information submitted after sentencing. State v. 
Bonaparte, 114 Idaho 557, 759 P.2d 83 (Ct. App. 1988). 
The Defendant does not allege that the Court imposed an illegal sentence. 
Rather, the Motion considered herein acknowledges that it is a request for leniency 
wherein the Defendant requests that the Court reduce the Imposed sentence. The 
attached Affidavit of the Defendant in support of this request sets forth numerous 
reasons why the Defendant believes that the sentence imposed by the Court is 
unwarranted and should be reduced. Such reasons include the Defendant's "empirical 
knowledge" of the sentences received by other offenders for the same crime for which 
the Defendant was convicted and the Defendant's belief that the imposed sentence is 
unjustified based upon his lack of a felony criminal record; statements made by the 
prosecutor at the time of sentencing that the Defendant characterizes as "religious 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S !.C.R. 35 MOTION WITHOUT A HEARING - 2 
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persecution;" the introduction of hearsay statements attributable to the Defendant's 
brother by the prosecutor at the time of sentencing; the lack of weight that the Court 
placed upon the Defendant's prior "civil contributions and volunteerism" and various 
certificates submitted at the time of sentencing and evidencing the Defendant's 
completion of various treatment program while incarcerated in the Twin Falls County 
Jail; the Defendant's objection to the prosecutor and/or Court characterizing the 
Defendant as "manipulative" and "deceptive;" the Defendant's contention that his non-
participation in the presentence investigative process pursuant to his constitutional 
rights was held against him by the Court; the fact that the Court imposed a sentence 
under the impression that the Defendant had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder 
whereas his true mental health diagnosis was post-traumatic stress disorder; and the 
Defendant's desire to change his behavior, including his consurnptio11 of alcohol, and 
his remorse for "how [his] beliefs, attitudes and actions affected the safety and lives of 
other persons." Despite the numerous reasons that the Defendant lists in his Affidavit in 
support of his Motion, the Defendant has identified no evidence that he would produce 
at a hearing that could not be produced through affidavit relating to these arguments. 
Nor has the Defendant made any showing as to why a hearing or oral argument in this 
case is warranted. Accordingly, the Court finds that a hearing on the Defendant's Motion 
is unnecessary. 
The Court has considered the Defendant's request for reconsideration or 
reduction of the imposed sentence in light of the Affidavit In support of his Motion. 
Having done so, the Court finds insufficient reason to grant leniency and alter the 
sentence previously Imposed in any manner. At the sentencing hearing In this case, the 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S I.C.R. 35 MOTION WITHOUT A HEARING ~ 3 
332 
 4 
 
0 
Court found that the Defendant had not come to accept responsibility for the criminal 
conduct resulting in his conviction and that he was not prepared to change. Despite the 
numerous extrinsic factors that the Defendant contends were either improperly 
considered or not considered by the Court in rendering its sentencing decision, the 
Court made clear that it gave no consideration to the Defendant's non-participation in 
the presentence investigation process and that its finding was based primarily upon its 
perceptions of the Defendant from courtroom interactions related to this case. The Court 
has considered thA Defendant's representation in his Affidavit regarding his mental 
health diagnosis. However, whether the Defendant Is diagnosed with post-traumatic 
stress disorder or bipolar disorder, such diagnosis does not alter the Court's perception 
regarding the Defendant's failure to accept responsibility for his conduct. Moreover, 
despite Defendant's statements in his Affidavit that he does, in fact, desire a change 
with regard to his use of alcohol and that he is sorry for tho conduct loading to his 
conviction in this case, such statements are unpersuasive to the Court given that its 
overall perception of the Defendant's attitude was formulated over the course of 
numerous court proceedings, Including two jury trials, since the Defendant's first 
appearance before the Court on June 6, 2014. 
Based on the review performed by this Court, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Mr. 
Andrus's Rule 35 Motion is DENIED WITHOUT HEARING. 
DATED this ry of December 2014. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S I.C.R. 35 MOTION WITHOUT A HEARING - 4 
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